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In the Supreme C.ou1·t of the State of Utah 
PRTTDENTIAL FEDT1JRAL SA VIN GS 
& LOAN ASSOCIA'l'ION, a cor-
poration, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE ST. PAUL INSURANCE 
COMP ANLE}S, 
Def end.ant and Apprllant 
and 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
J l\TSUHANCE AND '!'RUST 
ccnrPANY 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10765 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-respondent Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Association seeks a declaratory judgment against 
appellant only determining which of the two defendant 
insurance companies is liable to plaintiff on the two 
separate policies issued by defendants to plaintiff for 
its alleged loss. On motion of appellant, respondent First 
American Title Insurance & Trust Company was joined 
as a defendant. 
2 
DISPOSITION IN LO-WER COrlRT 
On July 21, 1966, the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Honorable A. H. Ellett presiding, entered Find-
ings of Fact and Summary Judgment declaring appellant 
liable to plaintiff upon its policy of insurance and dis-
missing respondent First American Title Insurance & 
Trust Company for failure to state a claim against it. On 
October 19, 1966, the same Court denied appellant's .Mo-
tion to Amend Findings of Fact and Summary .Judgment, 
and appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the District Court's Sum-
mary Judgment and Order of Dismissal of July 21, 
1966, in favor of both respondents and remand of the 
case to the District Court for trial, or in the alternative, 
reversal of the Judgment dismissing respondent First 
American and remand with instructions to. dismiss re-
spondent First American without prejudicP. 
STATEMENT OF F Acrrs 
Respondents filed Motions for Sununary Judgment 
based only upon the Complaint and Answers herein 
(R-27, R-30). Plainiff served appellant with an Affi-
davit supporting its Motion on July U, 19GG at 3 :15 p.rn. 
On hearing of the Motions on July lR, 19GG, two workinp: 
3 
days after serv1ce of the affidavit, appellant's counsel 
objected to the Court's considering the Affidavit (R-93, 
R-100 and Rtakd appellant had additional facts to 
presPnt (R-93, R-100). The Court permitted appellant to 
make an offer of proof thereon. This Statement of Fact 
is then based partially upon that offer, but only as 
indicated. 
Delmer D. Rowley had for many years been a loan 
officPr of plan tiff building and loan association (R-1). 
Ther0 had been a long history of dealings between plain-
tiff, Ro,wley & Security T'itle Company. Security Title 
knew plaintiff was in the first mortgage business (R-93, 
97). Rowley owned, hut had individually sold real prop-
aty to one Parker and wife on a contract in 1962 (R-38). 
Rowley had a 19Gl mortgage of about $1±,300 on the 
property with First Federal Savings & Loan Association 
(R-38). Respondent's counsel offered to prove Rowley 
also had a second mortgage with Buffo Realty, recorded 
February 10, 1961 (R-94). In December, 1962, the 
Parkers applied to plaintiff, through Rowley, for a mort-
gage loan of $16,300 to pay off Ro,wley's contract (R-1). 
Security Title Company, agents for respondent First 
American, on December 26, 1962, issued a preliminary 
title report showing the First Federal mortgage, but 
not the Buffo Realty mortgage, and advising a $16,300 
title policy would be issued to plaintiff on vesting 
of plaintiff's interest for a $36.25 premium (R-38). 
Security Title knew Parker and Rowley were refinancing 
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Parker's contract by the anticipated mortgage to plain-
tiff when it issued the preliminary report (R-97). Plain-
tiff, through Rowley, then lent the Parkers $16,300 
secured by a trust deed on the property and Rowley, 
as plaintiff's loan officer, disbursed $14,600 to himself 
to pay off Parker's contract and the balance to plaintiff 
for loan costs (R-2). Plaintiff's trnst deed was dated 
December 26, 1962. Rowley didn't pay off f~ither of the 
prior mortgages but continued to pay the monthly pay-
ments on them (R-2). 
Plaintiff's counsel offered to prove that when Row-
ley st>nt thP Parker trust deed to Security to be recorded, 
he sent written instructions saying in substance "don't 
issue the title policy until the First Federal mortgage 
is rPleased" (R-98). Respondents told the trial court 
they would not stipulate as to Rowley's instructions to 
Security Title Company (R-97), so the Court was aware 
of that factual dispute. In any event, it is obviously 
normal procedure for title companies not to issue title 
policies to mo.rt gage companies until defects shown in the 
preliminary report and which ought to be cured in closing 
the mortgage are in fact cured, so the title policy, when 
issued, will show in subsPquent portfolio examination:,; 
a valid first mortgage without material exceptions. 
Security recorded the Parker trust deed on January 
22, 1963. Plaintiff alleges, but hasnt proven, that in 
August, 1963, Security delivered respondent First Ameri-
~) 
ean's title policy to plaintff insuring the trust deed as 
a first lien, even though thE' First Federal mortgage had 
not be<'n paid off ( R--1-). Appellant offered to prove 
that this occurred hecausp Rowley paid off the Buffo 
second mortgage>, Security saw the release, mistook it 
for the rf'leas0 of the First FedPral mortgage and sent 
the title policy to plaintiff (R-9-1-, 95), and that had the 
First FPderal mortgage been shown on the title policy, 
the dE'falcation would haw tlwn hec>n discovered and 
Ho1dey could have then respondPd to the defalcation, 
lmt sine(~ the polic>• was regnlar on its face, it was placed 
in the loan folder, thPreby creating the impression to 
~mbseqnent auditors and bank E'XaminE'rs that plaintiff 
had a good first trust dePd (R-101). 
ln .l\larch, 19o5, plaintiff discovered other embezzle-
ments by Rowley and thereby found its Parker trust 
deed was not a first lien (R-35), and Rowley quit paying 
the First Federal payments. By letter of April 14, 1965, 
plaintiff made formal demand upon Security Title to 
forthwith clear the title to the Parker property of the 
First Federal lien and threatening legal action (R-77). 
On June 17, 19G5, Pugsley, Hayes, Rampton & Watkiss, 
then as attorneys for SPcurity Title, but now represent-
ing plaintiff, wrote to appellant's counsel with copy to 
plaintiff and Security rritle recommending that Security 
deny liability to plaintiff on its title policy, in effect 
~aying appellant is liable therefor (R-78,79). 
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Appellant's Savings, Building & Loan Association 
Blanket Bond with Extended Coverages (R-104) was 
in force by which appellant, among many other things, 
indemnified plaintiff "against any loss by reason of an)r 
dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of any employee ... 
including lo.ss of property" (R~l04). The bond indemni-
fies plaintiff against a myriad of other items such as 
claims expense, property damage during robbery or re-
lated crimes, payments to employees injured during roh-
bery, etc., lost instruments, loss of customer's property 
through robbery, etc., loss of pro·1wrty in transit, prop-
erty lost by fraud of any persons, loss through guaran-
teeing signatures, loss through counterfeit money, safr 
deposit liability, lost property, loss through forged or 
altered instruments, expenses o.f employees defending 
suits, liability for false arrest, etc. The Bond provides: 
''If the Insured holds other valid or collectible 
indemnity against any loss, covered herennder, 
the Underwriter shall be liable hereunder only for 
such amount of such loss as is excess of the 
amount o.f such other indemnity, not exceeding th!:' 
amount of coverage hereunder.'' 
On June 21, 1965, four days after its counsel recom-
mended liability be denied to plaintiff, Security Title paid 
all of the monthly payments then owing on the First 
Federal mortgage, and has paid all subsequent monthly 
payments, and has in its possession a payment book for 
paying the monthy payments (R-7:3, 7 4). 
7 
The rn•xt month, Security Title's counsel, now 
appearing for plaintiff, filed complaint for declaratory 
judgment, naming only appellant as defendant, but not 
S<'curity Title or its principal, First American. 
Appellant answPred (R-5) and raised issues o.f fact, 
among other things, by denying plaintiff suffered a loss, 
denying what plaintiff alleged appellant's bond provided, 
denying plaintiff made no reliance on the title policy 
prior to closing the loan and alleging that loans were 
always closed prior to the issuance of title insurance. 
Appellant moved the court to join First American as a 
defendant on grounds that plaintiff had a claim against 
First American, that First American had an interest 
in tht> action and \Vould be affected hy the declaratory 
judgment and that First American ought to be joined 
if complett> relief is to be a:c-corded the parties (R-6, 7). 
On :N ovemher 29, 19G5, the District Court ordered 
First Auwric-an Title Insurance joined as a party de-
fendant. 
Counsel for S0curity Title and plaintiff so couched 
the c-omplaint that defendant First American, Security 
Title's pincipal, ·could simply admit, and in fact did 
admit, all allegations and c-onclusions of the complaint, 
then•hy making it appear that plaintiff agreed with de-
fr•ndant :F'irst American and did not claim against it. 
Beeanse plaintiff might never cause Summons to· be 
:-:<•nec1 upon <lPfondant First American, appellant did 
B 
so, reqmrmg it to state fully jts position with regard 
to both the complaint and appellant's answer (R-10, 11). 
First American answered, admitting the Complaint, and 
as to appellant's answer, denying that its title policy 
was "other indemnity" within the exclusions of appel-
lant's policy, and alleging the First Federal mortgage 
was not insured by its policy because it prnvided in 
paragraph 3(d): 
"This policy does not insure against loss or 
damage by reason of tlw following: 
( d) ... Liens ... against thP title as insured 
or other matters ( 1) created, suffered, assumed 
or agreed to by tlw insured claiming loss or dam-
age; or (2) known to the insured claimant at thr 
date such insured Claimant acquired an estate or 
interest insured by this policy and not known to 
the Company or not shown by tlw public records: 
or ( 3) resulting in no loss to the insured claim-
ant." (R-22, 23). 
The transcript of hearing of respondents Motions 
for Smnmary Judgment indicates the Court grante<l 
respondents' Motions on the sole ground that the titl<' 
policy is not other indemnity within the meaning of 
appellant's polfry. The Court, in response to appellant's 
counsel's reference to the issue of ''other indPnmity,'' 
said ( R-98) : 
"THE COURT: vVell, I am safo;fied in my 
°''"n mind. I am willing to take my risk on that. 
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So I will hold that the title policy is not other 
indemnity within the meaning of St. Paul's policy 
and that - I should grant plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and deny-." 
On hearing, the Court specifically stated it was not 
passing upon any claim that plaintiff or appellant might 
have against defendant First American and declined to 
grant First American's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The 1Court said to appellant's counsel: 
"THE COURT: And shouldn't you fall heir 
to anything you ·can collect from the title com-
pany -
MR. PALMER: Sure. 
THE COURT: - if you pay off1 (R-95) 
4- * * 
THE COURT: I don't think it (appellant's 
offer of proof) matters a bit. I don't think the 
title company is involved in this at all, that there 
is no other indemnity for dishonest employees, and 
St. Paul is liable for that. N o·w I'm not sure but 
vvhat St. Paul may not have some right over 
against this (title) company. I doubt it They 
m'.ght have and T don't pass on that now." (R- 97). 
The Court, speaking to First American's counsel, 
~aid (R-98): 
10 
"THE COURT: \¥hat is your motion, that 
you have no liability over to Prudential or to 
St. Paul~ 
MR. DRAPER: To Prudential. I have no 
liability. 
THE COURT: To Prudential 1 
MR. DRAPJ~R: Well, that isn't quite right. 
THE COUR:T : You may have 
MR. DRAPER: That's true. 
THE COURT: I had better deny your motion 
because there is some fuss between you two (de-
fendants) that I 'rn not sure hut what it may be 
good. 
MR. DRAPER: Prudential has not sued First 
American. The only reason First American is in 
is that the court allowed St. Paul to bring them in 
as another defendant to determine in a declara-
tory manner which of these two policies was liable 
to Prudential. We say the St. Paul policy is the 
one they must -
THE COURT: I am ready to dismiss you 
- but that is no·t what you 're asking me to do 
with this motion, is it? 
MR. DRAPER: Well, [ th ink you have 
accomplished the same thing. 
11 
THE COURT: Just ruling for him~ (Mean-
ing plaintiff) 
MR DRAPER: Ruling for him. 
THI1J COURT: \Vill you draw the orded" 
The minute entry entered July 18, HJ6G (R-4c5), 
reflects: "the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion and denies 
Dt>fendant's ~lotion." 
On July 21, 19GG, the District Court entered Findings 
of Fact and Smrnnary Judgment (R-58 - 62), virtually 
reciting tht> complaint and finding plaintiff suffered a 
loss, declaring that First American's title policy does not 
constitute "othc->r insurance" within the exclusions of 
apvellant's policy, granting plaintiff's l\lotion for Sum-
mary Jndgnwnt, and dismissing defendant First Ameri-
ean "as no claim has bt>Pn statPd against it upon whi{'h 
rdief ean he granted." 
On August 1, 1966, appellant moved to amend (R-63 -
72), filing affidavits dPaling wiht the issues of whether 
plaintiff, in fact, clainwd against St>curity Title and re-
spondtint First American and whether plaintiff had suf-
f<>recl a loss. An affidavit supporting appellant's offer 
of llroof was not fih,d lwcause the Court indicated it 
was immatc->rial and the decision was made on the fore-
going grnnnds. ']'he motion again objected to the 
t;1Mlim'ss of plaintiff's affidavit, and pointed out the 
12 
insufficiency of the admissions in the answer to prove all 
the factual allegatons of the complaint. On hearing of 
that Motion on October 18, 1966, plaintiff, for the first 
time, offered a copy o.f appellant's bond in evidence. 
It was admitted (R-81, 104) and appellant's Motion 
to Amend was denied (R-82). Appellant appeals from 
the Summary Judgment on July 21, 1966. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF HAS SUS-
TAINED A LOSS AND THE EVIDENCE SHOWS PLAINTIFF 
HAS SUSTAINED NO LOSS. 
Not even in plaintiff's affidavit is thE>re evidence 
to show that the mortgage of First Federal Savings has 
not been paid. That was the first question inquired about 
by the Court on hearing of the Motions for Summary 
Judgment. The record, page 93, reflects : 
"THE COURT: ls that mortgage being paid 
up? 
MR. PUGSLEY: The mortgage is not delin-
quent. (argument)'' 
Plaintiff's counsel simply made that factual admis-
sion by way of argument, but it is not wrifiE'd Pvidencc 
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on which summary judgment can be based. Respondent's 
Affidavit of G0rald R. Christensen, Executive Vice-Pres-
ident of First Federal Savings (R-73, 74) shows that 
Security Title, defendant First American's agent, has 
paid all of the monthly payments due upon the mortgage 
and has th"' payment book in its possession. So long as 
someone other than plaintiff pays the ~~irst Federal mort-
gage, plaintiff isn't hurt at all by its existence, or at 
lPast plaintiff's evidence fails to show any damage or loss. 
Appellant, appealing from Summary Judgment, is 
Pntitled to all reasonahlE' inferences from the facts on 
this appeal. The reasonable infE>rences arising from 
the fact that First Am0rican 's agent, Security 'tiitle, is 
paying tlw first mortgage are: (l) plaintiff does claim 
against First American and Security Title, (2) they 
rPeognir,e tlwir liability to plaintiff upon the title policy, 
and ( 3) by the presurnpti on of the continuance of existing 
eonditions (lfo11sen v. Hansen, 110 Ut. 222, 171 P. 2d 392), 
they will pay or have agreed to pay the First Federal 
mortgage in full. It is furtlwr obvious that Security Title 
Company's former counsel, now appearing for plaintiff, 
sPeks b>' this aetion to pass on to app0llant the liability of 
First American and Security Title to plaintiff. No won-
der plaintiff has not sued First American, as First 
American's counsel represented to the court on the :Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment (R-99). No wonder plain-
tiff's counsel's memorandum conelndes plaintiff thinks 
appdlunt, not First American, is liable (R-5G). 
14 
Without evidence that the First Federal mortgage 
has not been paid, with plaintiff's counsel's admission 
that the mortgage is not delinquent, or with the evidence 
that Security Title Company is paying the current 
monthly payments on the First Federal mortgage and 
the resulting inference that it recognizes its liability to 
pay the whole mortgage, plaintiff fails to meet its burden 
of proo.f that it sustained any loss covered by appellant's 
policy. 
Therefore, the summary judgn1ent should be n•-
versed and the case remanded for trial. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT FIRST AMERICAN SPECIFICALLY IN-
SURED PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE PARTICULAR LOSS 
COMPLAINED OF, WHEREAS APPELLANT'S POLICY IS 
GENERAL, AND THE LOSS SHOULD BE BORNE BY THE 
SPECIFIC INSURER. 
The precise fact of which plaintiff complains is that 
plaintiff does not have a first lien upon the Parker 
property. The Complaint in paragraph 5 says (R-2): 
'·As a result ... the mortgage which the plain-
tiff company has upon the property ... is not a 
first lien upon the property and is secondary in 
right and priority .... '' 
In paragraph 7, plaintiff complains: 
15 
" (Rowley) thereby deprived the plaintiff 
of the first mo1igage lien as a result of the execu-
tion of tlw mortgage by the Parker'S to plaintiff.'' 
That plaintiff does not have the loan proceeds which 
Rowley appropriated does not cause plaintiff loss, for 
plaintiff loaned the funds to the Parkers for payment 
to Rowley and it was never intended that plaintiff have 
them. That the proceeds of the loan were paid to Rowley, 
of itself, does not cause plaintiff loss, for Parker's con-
tract of purchase ran to Rowley and to pay off Rowley 
and receive a deed to the property, thf' Parkers had to 
pay Rowley in full the contract balance due Rowley. 
Rowley failed to obtain a release o.f the First Federal 
mortgage and that breached his contract with Parker 
to deliver clear title to the property upon payment in 
full. It was Rowley's failure to obtain a release of the 
First Fed(~ral mortgage, but not his rf'ceipt of the funds 
from plaintiff or Parker in the first instance, that 
breached his obligation to Parker under the sales con-
tract and his obligation, as one of plaintiff's loan officers 
to pla«'e plaintiff's lif'n in first priort~'· 
Suppose Rowley had endorsed plantiff's check, de-
liwred it to First Fedf'ral 's messenger to pay the First 
Federal mortgage, but the messenger had forged the 
check and k(~pt the proceeds and First Americon issued 
the title policy without obtaining releasf' of First Fed-
eral's mortgage. Then R.owley would have violated no 
duty to plaintiff and clearly respondent First American 
16 
would be liable on its title policy. Suppo:se either First 
Federal's messenger or Rowley kept the loan proce>ed:,.; 
and forged a release on First Federal's mortgage; tlw 
title company would still be bound. 
Rowley could have delive>red the proceeds of the loan 
to himself and paid them to First Federal ·without viola-
tion of any duty to plaintiff. It follows that the cause 
of plaintiff's alleged loss is the failurl' to obtain release 
of the First Federal mortgage. That caused plaintiff's 
trust deed to be in second priority. Plaintiff specifically 
complains that its trust deed is not in first priority. 
Thus the precise fact which plaintiff i:mys caused its 
loss is also the precise fact against which respondent 
First American, for the policy pn•mium had and received, 
insured plaintiff, for First American specifically insured 
this trust deed of plaintiff's on this transadion to be a 
valid first lien and insured against nothing elsP. 
It is clear that it is the titlP policy which specifically 
insures plaintiff against the exact cause of plantiff 's loss 
and no.t appellant's "Savings, Building and Loan Associa-
tion Blanket Bond with Extended CoveragPs" (R-104) 
which insures agaim;t many more things than employee's 
fidelity. 
6 Appleman, Insurance La\v and PractieP, ~ 3912, 
provides: 
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p. 297. "A blanlu~t, compound or floater 
poliey is written upon a risk as a whol~, embracing 
whatever articles or items are included therein, 
often ehang"ing in its nature; in contravention 
thereto, a spP.cific policy is one which allocates the 
amount of the risk in stated values upon the sev-
eral items embraced in the coverage. In making 
an apportionment between blanket and specific 
policies, it is necessary that a rule be adopted 
that will give the insured complete indemnity 
for his loss. A blanket or floating policy is only 
intended to s1tpplement specific insurance, and it 
cannot become operative itniil the specific insiir-
a ncP has bePn P.rhansted. 
* * * 
p. 300. "Sina such blankPt policies are gen-
Prall,11 regardPd, and u.mally provide, that they 
operate as e.r;cess insitrance only over and above 
specific insHrance, they are not considered as 
other insurance so as to provide a policy defense 
to the spPcific in.rnrer, n.or for the purpose of 
prorating the lo<;s." (Emphasis a<ldf'd) 
R< 1StlondPnt First American's policy is specific, for it 
alloeates the amount of risk in stated values, that is, 
$16,300, the amount of plaintiff's trust deed, and is only 
upon the one item, that is, the validity and priority of 
plaintiff's trust deed. Appellant's bond is by its caption 
a hlankPt bond and embraces varying risks on various 
artieles of undefined property, possible liabilies and 
types of possible lossPS. 
Since th<' JH't'c:se fact of which plaintiff eomplains 
was imrnn1d hy rPspondont First Anwrican, since the 
18 
cause of plaintiff's alleged loss was the failure to obtain 
release of the First Federal mortgage and First Ameri-
can insured against that and since First American's pol-
icy is specific, whereas appellant's bond is general, the 
loss, if any, should be borne by First American. There-
fore the Summary Judgment against appellant and the 
order dismissing respondent First American should be 
reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
POINT III. 
IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED WHETHER PLAINTIFF 
SUSTAINED A LOSS WITHIN APPELLANT'S POLICY 
WITHOUT DETERMINING WHETHER RESPONDENT 
FIRST AMERICAN IS LIABLE ON ITS POLICY; THE 
COURT ERRED IN NOT DETERMINING WHETHER RE-
SPONDENT FIRST AMERICAN IS LIABLE AND IN FIND-
ING PLAINTIFF SUSTAINED A LOSS WITHIN APPEL-
LANT'S POLICY. 
On hearing on the ~fotion for Summary Judgment, 
the Court said ( R-97) : 
'"THE COURT: I don't think it (plaintiff's 
offer o.f proof as to First American's liability) 
matters a bit. I don't think that the~ title company 
is involved in this at all, that there is no other 
indemnity for dishonest employees, and St. Paul 
is liable for that. I'm not sure but what St. Paul 
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may not have some right over against this (title) 
company. I doubt it. They might have, and I 
don't pass on that now." 
If respondent First American is liable and collectible 
npon its policy, plaintiff will have suffered no loss as 
to appellant's policy. The District Court expressly re-
fused to find whether First American is liable and collect-
iblP on the title policy. 
Rowley paid off the Buffo Realty second mortgage 
which the title company missed in both the preliminary 
report and title policy, but plaintiff asserts no claim 
therefor (R-94). Just as no claim is asserted for the 
Buffo mortgage, if Rowley, or any third person, some 
months afh'r closing of the Parkt>r loan, had paid off 
the First Federal mortgage, plaintiff would have no 
claim against appe>llant for Rowley's failure to pay it 
earlier. Likewise, if some months after the closing, plain-
tiff accepted, not payment for the F'irst Federal mort-
gagt>, but a dPmand note, fully collectihe, from a third 
person promising to pay the First Federal mortgage, 
plaintiff would have no claim against appellant, for no 
loss would he sustained. So here, plaintiff has in its 
hands not a note, but a title insurance policy from re-
:-ipondent First American insuring plaintiff against loss 
if plaintiff's trust dt>ed is not a first lien on the 
Parker property. That i::i an insurance contract for which 
plaintiff rmid the required premium. Plaintiff's trust 
<levd is not a first lien on the Parker propNty and the 
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msurance contmct is breached. Absent a finding, as a 
matter of fact, that First American is not liable or is 
uncollectible upon its title policy, it cannot be said as a 
matter of fact that plaintiff has suffered a loss as to 
appellant's blanket bond. 
Plaintiff alleged both policies in this action for 
declaratory jugment and tendered to th«:> Court th(~ issue 
of which defendant is liibale. Appellant's Answ«:>r and 
the District Court's Order joining First American as a 
party defendant further highlighted that issue as the 
issue for determination in the case. The District Court, 
on Motions for Summary Judgment, then erroneously 
refused to consider the liability of defendant First Ameri-
can, even though the parties tendered that issue. 
Therefore, the District Court erred in refusing to 
find as a matter of fact whether respondent First Ameri-
can is liable and is collectibe upon its title policy, and 
erred in finding that plaintiff suffered a loss as to 
appellant's policy. The Summary Judgment should be 
reversed and the case remanded to the District Court with 
instructions to make findings upon the question of First 
American's liability so it can be determined, as a matter 
of fact, whether plaintiff had a loss as to appellant's 
policy. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT RESPONDENT'S TITLE POLICY IS NOT 
APPELLANT'S BLANKET BOND. 
Appellant's blanket bond (R-104) provides: 
"If the Insured holds other valid or collectible 
indemnity against any loss, covered hereunder, 
the Underwriter shall be liable hereunder only for 
such amount of such loss as is excess of the 
amount of such other indemnity, not exceeding 
the amount of coverage." 
Respondents argued there was no "other indemnity" 
within the terms of appellant's bond (R-23, 27) saying 
"other indemnity" applies only to other indemnity cover-
ing the same risks covered by appellant's policy, that 
respondent First American's title policy does not eover 
the same risk as appellant's bond. and that since plaintiff 
claims only against appellant, appellant is liable. 
That paintif f does claim against First American has 
been shown in Point I. Because of that fact, the Summary 
Judgment should be reversed on this ground alone. 
To so hold that the title policy is not "other indemn-
ity" within appellant's bond is to judicially reform the 
clear language and meaning of the bond, so that it reads: 
"If the Insured hold other valid or collectible 
fidelity indemnity against any lo.ss, covered here-
under, the Underwriter shall be liable hereunder 
only for such amount of such loss as is excess of 
the amount of such other fidelity indemnity .... " 
As previously shown, appellant's blanket bond covers 
many risks besides fidelity, such as property damage 
through crimes, indemnity for injured or killed em-
ployees, lost instruments, loss of property through rob-
. bery or other crimes, fraud by any person, guaranteeing 
signatures, etc., so it is highly illogical to read th<' 
limitation ·clause to say "other fidelity indemnity." 
The obvious purpose of appellant's loss limitation 
clause is to preclude an insured from recovering mon~ 
than his actual loss if his loss happens to be covered by 
more than one policy, in consonance with the long-stand-
ing rule of insurance law and public policy limiting any 
insured 's recovery through insurance to his actual loss. 
Without such a clause, plaintiff might here recover tht> 
amount of the First Federal mortgage from both def end-
ants. 
'There simply is no logical reason why a blanket 
policy insurance underwriter, insuring against many var-
ied contingencies, may not, in determining the policy 
premium; reco·gnize the fact that the insured may 
often obtain other coverage and thus provide in thP 
blanket po.lie.\' that it is C'XCPss to the other coverage. 
'l'li<'re is no lop;ical 1·eason v,·hy thP other insurancP, what-
''VC'l' its rov<·rng«', should not be lookc·d to. 
f'nrtlH'r, it is fallflcious to sa:.- that therC' are differ-
1·nt risks i1wolvPd in the l\rn polic!Ps of d<'fC'nrlants. Tlw 
ri:;;k of whirh plaintiff complains is tlw loss of priorit_\· 
of its 1110rtgag<'. That is thf' actea1 loss or damagP ]llain-
tiff rdk•gc_'s, hut has not proven, it s·t~i'L::i.inPd. RPspondPnt 
First A mPrican insured ag-ainst 
"nny loss or dmnag(' ... snstain(Pd) by rrason 
of ... the prio1<ty over thP rnortgagP at tlw <lat<> 
hPn•of of any liPn or <'nrmnbranrP not shown or 
rcfrr;·('(l to in 8ehedul<' B or <>xclndt-d from cover-
agP in tlw conditions and stipulations.'' (R-23). 
Appc•llnnl, muong oOwr thiu:~·s, insnn·cl aga:nst "any loss 
hy i·<·n~~on of any d sl1om0 st, frnndnlp11t or eriminal uct of 
an.\· (•111plo~·l'<', ... including loss o.f property." The 
"any loss" allrgedly sustained under both policirs was 
thP failtm· to ohta:n rPlE·nlw of tlw First F'<>clPrnl mort-
gage~. 'l'lt<•:;<' imrnr~ng c1aus<>s ])oth 1·over tlw samP loss 
and tlw sanw risk, that is, tlw ri:o;k of bss of ]Jlaintiff's 
priority OV('t' the· First F('dPrnl rnortgagt'. 
rl'lint tlw poL('ies rt>V<'l' the s:rnw risk is more ch•arly 
shO\rn hv eonsidering that the titlP pol;cy insures "against 
loss or d::unagP sustain (eel) hy reason of any defect in 
llit· (·'~<·(·ntion of the rnortgagP (insurPJ) ", whPrPas appel-
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lant's policy also insures against "any loss ... by reason 
of the forgery or alteration of ... any instrument. ... '' 
Suppose Mr. Parker had forged Mrs. Parker's signature 
on plaintiff's trust deed. Clearly both policies would 
apply, as would the loss limitation clause of appellant's 
policy providing for payment of "only for such amount of 
such loss as is excess of the amount of such other indemn-
ity." 
There simply is no logical reason to apply the "samP 
risk" exception here. The lack of logic is amplified by 
noting that if respondent's title policy is looked to first 
and it is determined that respondent First American is 
liable upon its policy, then the claimed "same risk" excep-
tion to appellant's loss limitation clam:e never comes into 
consideration. Respondents cannot herP say no. claim 
has been asserted against respondent First American 
and that First American's title policy should not b<> 
looked at first, because the evidence shows plaintiff did 
by letter of April 14, 1965, make formal demand upon 
Security Title Company, agent for respondent First 
American (R-77), and Security Title's counsel, no·w coun-
sel for plaintiff, responded on June 17, 1965 ( R-78) 
saying: 
"However, we would have no choict' now but 
to recommend to our client (Security Title) that 
it deny the liability asserted heretofore hy Pru-
dential in regard to the Parker loan. Thus, we do 
no·t believe that there is any other insurance or 
indt>mnity covering the loss sustained hy Pruden-
tial, so as to afford your St. Paul Company an 
excuse for failing to discharge their obligation 
to Prudential." (R-78, 79). 
Tht> evidence shows Security Title has been paying the 
First Ff>deral rnortgag<> (R-73, 74). In light of that 
evidence, tht> title policy should be looked to first, and if 
liability is found thereon, appellant's policy never C'omes 
into C'onsideration at all. 
Research has failed to disclose any case applying 
the "same risk" exception to the perfectly logical "other 
insuranC'e'' loss limitation clause of the either bankers 
blankf't bonds or fidelity bonds, or involving an over-
lapping of such bonds with title policies. 
The closl'st C'ase in point found is Hartford Steam 
Rnila Inspection & Jnsurancr, Co. v. Cochran Oil llf ill & 
Oinnery Co. (Ga. 1!)21) 105 S.1~. 85G, involving a boiler 
policy and an Pmployer's liability policy, each providing 
it was excess to other insurance. Plaintiff sued only on 
the boiler policy hut was rf'pn1 s(mted by counsrl for tlw 
employer's liability insurPr. The boiler policy insurt'd 
plaintiff, first, for property loss hy explosion of plain-
tiff's boiler, and second, against liability for personal 
injuries from boiler explosion. The employer's liability 
polie~' insured against liability for injury to employees 
from whakver cause. An employee was injured through 
a boiler explosion. The court held there was no liability 
11ndn tlte boikr policy b(•cause the employer's liability 
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polircy was specific as to injured Pmployeps and that the 
hoiler policy was general as to pPrso.ns, <'rnploy0Ps or 
not, hurt in hoil0r Pxplosions. ConsPquentl,\-, thP Prn-
ployer's liability policy "-as regarded as the primary 
insurance, and since the loss was not in excess of the 
amount of the emplo,\-er's liahility polic,\r, no liability 
accrued under the ho.j]er policy. 
The Court then' recognized tlw rule rE>spondents rel>-
upon, saying: 
"The proposition is simple (~nough, when~ 
there are several valid policiPs in different com-
panies, which insure the same party, upon tlH' 
same suhject-matter, and assume the same risk. 
This constitut0s \Ylrnt is denominated 'double in-
surance,' and under a statute of this state( cited), 
and according to the rules established h,\r all of 
the courts, each policy must in such a case con-
tribute proportionately to the loss, even in absPnc<> 
of any specific provision so n•quiring. Firemrm's 
Fund Ins. Co. v. Pekar, 106 Ga. 1, 31 SE 779(:2). 
Where, however, thE> insurance is not strictly and 
technicallv 'double' insurance - that is, 1Dhere 
the polici~s are not limited to the smne su!Jject 
matter, a·nd the risk assumed is not identiwl or 
coP:rte11sirP, lmt one policy is a 'ge11erul,' 'com-
pound' or 'blanket' policy r111d the o th Pr is 'spe-
cific' and the rnles of priority are not specifically 
p~ovided for by the policie' themselves - _tht>re 
arises a great diversity and laek of harmony m tlw 
various rules laid do-wn by tlH' ap1wllate courts of 
different jurisdictions. 
"In a case such as is now before us (that is, 
1chere the several policies are of a different nature 
and character, and where the risk assumed is only 
partially coextensive, and where each policy ex-
pressly provides that the risk assumed, at the 
point of mutual contact, is 'ex·cess' insurance only, 
and thE>refore secondary to the other policy) the 
deeisive test to be appliedin determining which of 
these two limitations is to be given effect (that is, 
which is really primary or basic insurance, and 
which is excess insurance only) lies in the answer 
to the question as to which insurance is general 
and which is specific in nature." (Parenthesis 
theirs). 
The Court noted the boiler policy was more general 
as to the protection afforded because it covered primarily 
property loss and secondarily personal injury, and be-
cause it covered any persons injured, while the employ-
er's policy prntected only injured employees. It no.ted 
plaintiff's urging that the boiler policy was more spe-
cific because it was confined to injuries from one par-
ticular and stated cause, boiler explosions. The Court 
said: 
"The reason for the difficulty which seems to 
arise when we undertake to definitely po.int to one 
of these policies as specific and the other as gen-
eral lies in the difference in the nature and char-
acter of the contracts. . . . In the instant case, 
although the policies are in part coextensive as to 
risk, they are nevertheless of very different type 
and character . ... The nature of the risks and 
duties assumed, as well as the subject matter of 
thr insuratice. is widely diverse. The only point 
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of contact, the only contingency under which ho.th 
~o~ic~es become applicable, is where an employee 
is in1ured on account of a boiler or pipe explosion 
(emphasis theirs). For the purpose of compari-
son it would seem to be proper, therefore, to dis-
regard the various elements and provisions of the 
two contracts, except as they bear or relate to the 
happening of the one contingency wnder which 
each policy might be held primarily or secondarily 
liable (emphasis theirs). 
* * * 
"Upon an employee being injured by such an 
explosion, the (boiler policy) is liable first and 
primarily for the inevitably resulting property 
loss, and, should there then be a surplus of insur-
ance left over, it is liable for injuries occasioned 
ho.th to employees and to others not employees. 
Upon the happening of such a contingency the lia-
bility of (the employer's policy), on the other 
hand, is limited solely to personal injuries to em-
ployees. Thus, in any case where both of the 
p-0licies could possibly take effect, the liability 
of the (b-Oiler policy) is general, while that of the 
(other) is limited and specific. (Parenthesis 
added, except as indicated.) 
In the case at bar, the contingency which brings both 
policies into play is an employee's dishonest failure to 
obtain release of a prior mortgage. The Georgia case 
expressly recognizes situations where the pohcies are 
"widely diverse" "in type and character" and "in nature 
of risks and duties assumed" as in the case at bar. It 
held the boiler policy and employer's liability policy "are 
in part co-extensive as to risk" though "the nature of 
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the risks and duties assumed, as well as the subject-
matter of the insurance, is widely diverse." The Court 
did not preclude a boiler insurer from looking to an 
employer's liability policy for "other insurance" in a 
boiler explosion case and appellant as a savings and 
loan blanket insurer cannot here be precluded from 
looking to a title insurPr for other indemnity when the 
policies "are in part co-extensive as to risk," that is, the 
risk of a "dishonest act of an employee" impairing "the 
priority" of plaintiff's trust deed. 
Here, regardless of which policy is specific and which 
g·eneral, only appellant's policy contains the "excess in-
surance" clause. As between an "excess" policy and a 
"no loss" policy, as is the title policy, the great majority 
of courts hold the "no loss'' insurer liable, saying the 
"e~:cess" policy is not availahlf> until the "other insur-
ane<>" is exhausted. Appleman, Insurance Law & Prac-
tice, Sec. 491-±; 29A Am Jur, Insurance, Sec. 1716; 46 
A'LiR 2d 1165. 
ln the Georgia case, the Court refused to look solely 
to physical factors of how the loss occurred; that is, a 
boiler explosion, but instead looked to the loss itself in 
determining whether the policies covered the same risks 
and wen• co-extensive. So here, the physical factor of 
PH1ployee's fidelity as a cause of loss cannot be solely 
looked to. The loss itself is here covered by both policies 
and so thc> risks covc>red are co-extensive and the same. 
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The Georgia case is a leading case cited by many 
authorities. See, for example, 8 Appleman, Insurance 
Law, p. 378, and 45 CJS, Insurance, Sec. 925, p. 1039. 
Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, Sec. 1848, deal-
ing with "proportionate recoveries and contributions," 
begins the section with the note: "The various rules 
are discussed at some length in Hartford S.B.I. Co. 
v. Cochran, 105 SE 856." It has been cited with ap-
proval numerous times, including in Employers Liability 
A. Corp. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., (Cal. 1951) 227 
P.2d 56; Commercial Gas. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & 
Ind. Co., (Minn. 1934) 252 N.W. 435; and Continental 
Gas. Co. v. S1dtenfield, (IC.A. 5th, 1956) 236 F.2d 438, fo.r 
the proposition that where the policies are partially co-
extensive, both policies may still be looked to. 
In M,iller v. Home Ins. Co. (Pa. 1933) 164 A. 819 
where one policy indemnified against loss by tornado, 
and another policy against loss by fire and tornado, the 
Court said: 
"'The lower court, reasoning by analogy from 
those (prior) cases, concluded that, if there was 
not identity of subject where one item in a policy 
covering a building alone and an item in another 
policy covered building and contents, there would 
not be identity of risk where one policy covered 
fire and another covered fire and tornado. Pre-
cisely at this point WP beli\:'VP the lower court fell 
into error in no.t giving proper consideration to 
the contract of insurance. We are all of the op in-
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ion that there was double insurance as the term 
is here used, and the two im;urers were bound bv 
thf' sarrw risk." · 
Here again, the Court refused to look to the physical 
factors of the cause of loss, that is, tornado v. tornado 
and fire, but looked to the object of the policiPs, or what 
was insured, to decide if there is "identity of risk." In 
tlw case at bar the object of appellant's fidelity coverage 
is ''any loss, including loss of property,'' and this fidelity 
coverage is secondary and incidental to the other cover-
ages of property loss through crime, loss of customer's 
property, loss of property through fraud by any persons, 
any loss through guaranteeing signatures, counterfeit 
money, forgPry of insurance and other clauses of appel-
lant's IH>licy. '11 he object of respondent First American's 
volicy is specifically and solely the title to the real prop-
erty and insured "against any loss or damage ... by 
reason of ... the priority over the mortgage of any other 
lien." 'l'hus, the object of the title policy here is the 
iuorr specific and the objects of the two policies, that is 
the failure to obtain release of the First Federal mort-
gage, are both tht> same. 
Ht>8pondent 's argwnent fails as a matter of logic 
and in light of the authorities cited. 
'J'he only authorities \\·hich plaintiff cited in its rnem-
orarnlum to t1w trial court for its contention that there 
i,; ''tltlwr insurance'' onl~y where the insun'd insures the 
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same thing twice against the same perils were 29A Arn 
Jur p. 153 and Couch, Encyclopedia of Law Insurance, 
p. 3635. These authorities are taken from chapters per-
taining to "Particular Concealments, Representations, 
Warranties and Conditions." The "same risk" rule relief 
upon arises from cases \d1ere the insurance policies 
contain warranties by insured that they will no.t obtain 
other rnsurance and provide they will be void if 
other insurance is obtained (29A Am .Tur p. 149). 
In those instances, there is reason to strictly construe 
"other insuranc.e'' so as to avoid a forfeiture. Such is 
not the case here, for the "other indemnity" clause of 
appellant's policy does not seek to avoid liability but to. 
indemn·i.fy plaintiff so that the insured recovers from 
both policies only the actual amount of his loss and no 
more. 
For these reasons, the Court erred in ruling that 
respondent's title policy is not "other indemnity" within 
appellant's bond and in not ruling that appellant's lia-
bility is limited to the excess of other valid or collectible 
indemnity over and above the title policy. The sum-
mary judgment should he reversed and the case remanded 
for determination of respondent titlt> insurer's liability, 
with instruction that respondent First American's policy 
is "other indemnity" within appellant's hond. 
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POIN1T V. 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT DO EXIST, AND THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT. 
Plaintiff's Affidavit was served upon appellant on 
Thnrsday, July 1-1-, 1966 at 3 :15 p.m. (R-36), two work-
ing days before hearing of plaintiff's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment on Monday, July 18, 1966. At hearing, 
appellant objected to the timeliness of the affidavit and 
appellant specifically advised the court that additional 
facts needed to be presented to the Court before the 
Motion should be heard (R-93, 100). 
Rule 6(d), U.R.C.P., provides: "\iVhen a motion is 
supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with 
the motion." 
Rules 56(c) and (e), U.R.C.P.,provide: 
"rI'ht> motion shall be served at least ten days 
before the time fixed for hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve op-
}Jos ing affidavits .... 
''Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
rnadt> on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to h'stify to th0 matters stah'd therein." 
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The "shall" in Rule 6( d) makes it mandatory that 
affidavits be served with motions and Rule 56(c) means 
affidavits must be servPd 10 days before hearing of mo-
tions for summary judgment. Without this rule, thr 
opponent simply has no time to obtain rebuttal affidavits 
or to present additional facts. 
In Canrning v. Star Publishing Company, 19 FRD 
281, the opponent to summary judgment moved to strike 
the movant's affidavit filed the day of hearing of the 
motion. The Court said : 
"Under F.R. 56(b), defendant has the elec-
tion of filing supporting affidavits with his mo-
tion. I observe Federal Rule 6( d) applicable to. 
all motions. 'When a motion is supported by affi-
davit, the affidavit shall be served with the mo-
tion.' This leaves no room for judicial discretion. 
Plaintiff's motion to strike is granted." 
See also Sardo i:. McGrath, ('C.A.D.C., 1952) 19G F.2d 
20, saying: 
"Without such notice that allegations of fact 
are being made for the record, there is no real 
opportunity to enter the responses necessary to 
create the genuine issue of material fact which can 
stave off summary judgmPnt.'' 
Further, plaintiff's affidavit (H-:3:3) fails to show 
that it is made on personal knmdPdge or to show affirma-
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tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the mat-
tern stated, contravening Rule 56(e). 
For these reasons, the affidavit of plaintiff should 
not have been corn;iderPd by the court in ruling upon 
the motions for summary judgment. This leaves the 
complaint and answers as the only documents properly 
before the Court in ruling on the motions. Therefore, 
tlw following findings are not supported by the admis-
sions contairn~d in the complaint and answers. 
(a) Finding No. 3. Appellant's ans\ver admits its 
hond provides for the indemnification set forth therein, 
hut dmies plaintiff's allt>gation of what the bond pro-
vid0s. r_l'he bond, however, was not admitted into evidence 
until October 18, 1966, when appellant's Motion to Amend 
\ms heard (R. 81 ). ·without the bond in Pvidence, and 
with an issue of fact existing as to its provisions being 
raised hy tlw pleadings, the Court could not have deter-
mirn-•d as a rnattPr of fact what it provided and could 
not have derided appellant's liability thereon as a matter 
of lmv. This is critical to appellant, for without the bond 
before it, thP Court could not have determined which 
policy was general and which specific or whether or not 
the policies covered the same risks. 
(b) Finding No. (i. The Court found "Plaintiff 
has suffered a loss as a result of said dishonest ... act 
of the employee, Rowley." Appellant's answer denies 
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that plaintiff has suffered a loss. There was no evidence 
before the District Court even in plaintiff's affidavit to 
show whether or not tbe First Federal mortgage had been 
paid at the time of hearing, and appellant's affidavit 
(R-73, 74) affirmativley shows that Securitv Title has 
been malting all of the payments on the First Federal 
mortgage, inferring that Security Title or the title in-
surer has agreed to pay the entire mortgage. Further, 
if respondent First American is liable and collectible 
upon the title policy, then plaintiff has in fact suffered no 
loss. The District Court refused to find whether respond-
ent First American is so liable and collectible. For these 
reasons the finding that plaintiff has suffered a loss is 
in error, or at least there is a material issue of fact as 
to whether plaintiff has sustained a loss, and the sum-
mary judgment should be reversed. 
( c) Finding No. 10. The finding that "plaintiff 
made no reliance on said policy prior to closing tht> 
loan'' is in no way supported by the evidence and is a 
genuine issue of fact. Appellant's answer denied that 
allegation of the ,Complaint (R-6). 
Rowley's misapplication of the proceeds of plain-
tiff's loan was discovered in March, 1965 ( R.-36). Hence, 
plaintiff did in fact rely upon the title policy, for when 
it was received in August, 19G3, it reflected plaintiff'~ 
lien as a first lien. Had it shown the true fact, that 
plaintiff's lien was secondary, the defalcation would haw 
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been discovered and Rowley could have then paid the 
rull amount of the defaultation. Since the title policy 
erroneously showed plaintiff's lien as prior, the policy 
was placed in the loan folder, examined by subsequent 
auditors and the loss was not discowred until March of 
1965, at which time Rowley could not respond. There-
fore, plaintiff did rely on the title policy as issued, 
to its damage (R-101). 
Moreover, the preliminary titlP rPport of Decemb€r 
H), 19():2 quoted a premium for a $16,300 "A'TA" (rnort-
gaget''s) titl1> policy (R-:37), and reflected the First 
Federal mortgage as an exception. Security Title knew 
11lainti ff anti{'i imted having a valid first mortgage on 
thP Parker property and that Parker's purchase con-
trart with TiowlPy was bPing refinanced (R-97). Security 
Urns kiww that plaintiff anticipated receiving a titk 
policy showing its trust deed as a first lien which would 
iwecssarily mean plaintiff anticipated receiving a policy 
which insurrd thr validity of the anticipated release of 
tlw First Federal mortgage. Part of the policy premium 
was to insure the existPncr and validity of that release. 
First Auwrican bound itself to pay plaintiff its loss 
if plaintiff's trust deed was not a first lien and if the 
Virst FPderal rnortgagP had not rwen validly released. 
rt hasn't hPen rPleased, and it do('S not no,w lie in respon-
d(•ut 's mouths to say there was no n•liance upon the titk 
l )() l i<>>'. 
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Suppose Rowley had properly paid First Federal 
but First Federal failed to release its mortgage and 
the title company mistakenly insured plaintiff's trust 
deed as a first lien. Then the title insurer could not 
say plaintiff didn't rely on the policy, for one o.f the 
things plaintiff bought 'vhen it bought the policy was 
msurance that the First 1'\1 deral mortgage had been 
released. 
The title policy (R-26) contains an exC'lusion in para-
graph 3(d) (2) for "liens ... known to the Insured Claim-
ant at the date such Insured Claimant acquired an estate 
or interest insured by the policy, and not known to tlw 
Complaint or not slwwn by the puhlic records." Tlw 
First Federal mortgage was shown by public records and 
was known to the title company for it was shown in the 
preliminary report (R-38). A title insurer's liability 
depends upon the contract and not upon notice to thP 
owner or his lmo,,-ledge of the instruments of record: 
Appleman Insurance Law & Practice, ~5209; Holly Hotel 
Co. v. Title Guarantee Tritst Co., (N.Y. 1933) 264 N.Y.S. 
3, 14 7 Misc. 861. 
"\Vhere at the time a title policy was dcliY-
ered, th<> title was defective 11y rPason of a lirn, 
the contract was brearlwd and the company wa~ 
immediately liable> to the insnrPcl for the loss ac-
tually suff.erecl." A pplernan, 1nsuraneP Law & 
Practice, ~5210. 
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Respondents argue that Rowley's defalcation and 
tht> loss occmed in December, 1962, whereas the title 
policy was not issued until August, 1963, and therefore 
plain ti ff made no reliance on the title policy at the time 
of th<' defalcation. However, this disregards not only 
the foregoing authorities but also rPspondents' allega-
tion that plaintiff did not discover the loss under 
March, 19G5, long after the title policy was delivered 
(R-:15). Appellants bond (R-104) in the first para-
g-raph provides coverage against losses which "shall 
happen at any time but which are discovered by the in-
sur<:'d subs0quent to noon of the date hereof." Hence, 
the measnring time for detenning whether or not there 
i:,; any "othPr valid or collectible indemnity against any 
loss, coverPd hPreunder" it at time of discovery of the 
loss or at time of presentation o.f the proof of loss to 
appellant. rrhat this is so is clearly shown by considering 
tha.t if rPspondents' argument were correct, then even 
if Rowh·:-' paid off the First Federal mortgage before 
ih<' loss was discovered, plaintiff could still claim indem-
nity from defendants. 
1<-,or thesP reasons, Finding No. 10 is to "reliance'' 
is not supported by the evidence, and is erroneous. 
POTNT YI. 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT DO EXIST AS TO 
WHETHER THE TITLE INSURER IS LIABLE. 
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Respondent First American asserts as a defense 
(R-23) the exclusions from coverage of liens "created, 
suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claiming 
loss or damage," and says the acts and knowledge of 
Rowley, plaintiff's loan o.fficer, are imputable to plain-
tiff so that the First Federal lien is one created, suf-
fered, assumed or agreed to by plaintiff. This presents 
the agency question, raised by the pleadings, of whether 
Rowley's acts are imputa:ble to plaintiff. This is a mixed 
question of fact and law upon which there is no evidence 
before the Court which could determine this fact issue 
as a matter of law. This issue involves such questions 
as whether Rowley was acting within the scope of his 
employment in committing the tort and whether the 
facts justify imputing to plaintiff Rowl<'y's knowledge 
that the prior First Federal lien had not been released. 
Appellant urges that the facts herf' will bring into 
application the rule that where an agent is acting per-
sonally and adversely to his principal in committing an 
independent fraudulent act for his own aiccount and the 
knowledge which is to be imputed to the principal is so 
involved in his act that it is to the agent's interest to 
conceal it from the principal, there is raisf'd a clear 
presumption that the agent will not indicate the fach' 
to the principal and therefore his knowledge is held not 
to be imputed to the principal to bind him to the third 
person. 3 Am J ur 2d p. 6-t.:t. 
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Further, appellant relies upon the factual theo.ry, 
as contained in appellant's offer of proof, that Security 
'l'itlt> Company knew plaintiff took only first mortgages 
(R-96), knew Rowley owned the Parker property and 
was refinancing the Parker contract to pay himself off 
at the time the preliminary title report was issued, as 
stipulated to by plaintiff (R-97), and therefore Security 
'l'itle, rrspo.ndent's agent, knew that Ro,vley was also 
acting for the hmefit of himself, and knew that he had 
exceeded his authority in not paying off the First Federal 
mortgage when the title policy was issued. The knowledge 
of tlw double agency and the knowledge that the first 
mortgage hadn't been released (which the title company, 
hy its contract, is bound to know) had to make the trans-
action suspicions on its face to the title insurer when it 
i:-:s1wd the policy. 
Section Hl5 of the Restatement of Agency, Second 
)ll"OVi<le:-:: 
"A disclosed or partially disclosed principal 
is subject to liability upon a contract purported 
to lw made on his acrount hy an agent authorized 
to Blake it for the principal's benefit, although the 
agent acts for his own or other im~roper pur-
poses, .unless th.e other party. h~s n,otzce t~t the 
agent zs not actmg for the pnnczpal s benefd. 
" ( c) Reason to bww improper motive. 
\Ylwther or not the third 1wrson has reason to 
knmv of the agent's impro1wr motive is a question 
nf fact. If he knows that the agL'nt is acting for 
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the benefit of himself or a third person, the trans-
~ction is suspicious on its face, and the principal 
is not bound unless the agent is authorizt>d." 
Sec. 166, Restatement of Agency Second provides: 
"A person with notice of a limitation of an 
agent's authority cannot subject the principal to 
liability upon a transaction with the agent if he 
should know that the agent is acting improperly. 
" (a) If a person has information which would 
lead a reasonable man to believe that the agent 
is violating the orders of the principal, or that 
the principal would not wish the agent to act 
under the circumstances known to the agent, he 
cannot subject the principal to liability. Any sub-
stantial depart1trc by an a.gent from the 11siwl 
methods of conducting business is ordinarily a 
sufficient warning of lack of authorizat1:on." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The obvious irregularities, the delay between Dec. 
1962 and August 1963, and the title company's lmowledgP 
of Rowley's double agency precludes the title insurer 
from imputing Rowley's knowledge and Rowley's acts 
to plaintiff and therefore the First Federal mortgagr 
was not a lien "created, suffered, assumed or agreed to" 
by plaintiff. 
In Hansen v. Western Title Insurance Co., (Cal. 
1963) 220 Cal. App. 2d 531, 98 ALR 2d 520, the court 
construed this clause and held an encumhranc(~ "err-
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ated" by the insureds was not one which resulted from 
mere inadvertence bnt that "created" meant a conscious 
deliberate causation, particularly where the insurer had 
an opportunity to know of the defect before it issued 
the policy an<l where the insured was not guilty of in-
tentionaU~r producing the claim against the property. 
In First National Bank & Tntst Co. v. New York 
Title l11s11ranre Co., (1939) 171 Misc. 854, 12 NYS 2d 
703, the court held "assumed or agreed to" referred to 
a particular defect or encumbrance assumed or agreed 
to by tlw insured by the title conveyance to it or some 
rollatPral agreement, made by the insured with reference 
to the property; "created'' ref erred to some affirmative 
art on tlw part of the insured; and "sufferPd," being 
synonyrnous with "permit,'' implied thP power to prohibit 
or prPvPnt and includf'd knnwlt>dge of what was to he 
done with the intention that it be donP. 
Unless Rowlf'y's knowledge and acts are imputable 
lo plaintiff, thP exclusion in thP title policy cannot apply 
to plaintiff. 
In Baumann v. Puget Sowul Title Insurance Co., 
(Wash. 193;)) 49 P.2d 914, def Pndant title company is-
~nC>d a Ule polic~' insuring plaintiff against any encum-
hrnnee impairing the sPcurity of plaintiff's mortgag<> 
giwn hY the mortgagor Aust. Aust represented the mort-
gag<> to plaintiff as a first mortgag<>. 'Ylwn the po.licy was 
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delivered there was an outstanding first mortgage which 
was not mentioned in the title policy. Plaintiff sued and 
the title company claimed mutual mistake and prayed 
for reformation of the policy so as to show the real first 
mortgage as an exception, claiming it had issued a pre-
liminary title report addressed to plaintiff under which 
the real first mortgage was shown, and said that plantiff, 
acting with kno·wledge of the contents of the preliminarr 
report, was bound by its terms and that he consmmnatPd 
the loan in reliance on the preliminary report and not 
on the policy. The court expressly refused to rule on 
the soundness of that contention, saying it was not sup-
ported by the facts because the preliminary report had 
been delivered to Aust and never shown to plaintiff. The 
court said: 
"There was no mistakP or inequitable con-
duct on (plaintiff's) part. By fortuitious circum-
stance, the plaintiff insure·d his mortgage for what 
it purported to be and for what he had b<c•en led 
to believe it was - a first mortgage. Under these 
facts, defendant cannot escape its obligation under 
the policy on the ground of mutual mistake." 
Likewise, in this case, if Rowley's knowledge of the 
First Federal mortgage is not imputable to plaintiff 
under the authorities heretfore cited, then First Anwri-
can insured plaintiff's mortgage for what plaintiff had 
been led to believe it was - a first mortgage - and can· 
not escape its obligation under the contract on tlw ground 
of mutual mistake. 
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Further, the title insurer here cannot claim mutual 
mistake, for by its policy it bound itself not to make 
such a rnistakl:'. If title policies could be avoided simply 
he-canst> the insurer makes a mistake, they would bl' vir-
tually worthless. There was no mutual mistake here; 
tlw title company knew and was bound to know the First 
Federal mortgage hadn't been released and plaintiff, 
relying on the title policy, simply assumed it had been 
relr•ased by the title polic~T's rcpresPntation that it had. 
bePn. 
For these reasons, there are material issues of fact 
"xisting as to whethl'r respondent title insurer is liable 
on its title policy. The summary judgment should there-
fore be reversed ana th!' cas!' remanded for trial. 
POIKT YTL 
THE DISTRICT ERRED IN DISMISSING RESPONDENT 
FIRST AMERICAN "FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM". 
The 8ummary JudgmPnt of .July 21, 1966 dismissed 
rPsponclent First Aml'rican as a party defendant "as 
no claim has bt>en stated against it upo.n which relil'f 
ean be granted." (R-62) 
That 8nmmarv Judgment is contrary to the Court's 
mimttP entry (R-4-5) ·which denit•d def!'ndant First Am-
•·r;can 'f; motion, and is contrary to thP Court's ruling 
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on hearing of the motion, and as previously indicated, 
the Court several times refused to rule on First Ameri-
can's liability. 
Plaintiff, and no one else, filed this actio.n for declar-
atory judgment, alleging the policies of both defendants 
and the issues betwee-n them but joined only appellant as 
a party and prayed the Court "make a declaratory 
judgment ... stating whether or not said defendant ( ap-
pellant) is excused from its liability by reason of the 
existence of the said policy of title insurance." (R-4). 
Thus, the issue o.f the liability of the respective defen-
dants was tendered to the Court by plaintiff and declar-
atory relief was sought. 
By 78-33-2, U.C.A. 1953 : 
"Any person interested ... under a written 
contract ... may have determin1:1d any question 
of construction or validity arising under tlw in-
strument ... in dt>claratory actions." 
Section 78-33-11, U.C.A. 1953, provides as to declar-
atory judgments: 
"\Vhen declaratorv relief is sought all per-
sons shall be madf' parties who haw or claim any 
interest which would he affected hy the dPclar-
ation, and no declaration shall prejudiee the rights 
of persons not rmrtiPS to the lll'Oeeeding. '' (I~lll­
phasis added) 
47 
Here involved is not only the question of which 
dPf Pndant insurer is liable to plaintiff, but also the 
qtwstion of ultimate liability behYeen the insurers upon 
subrogation to planitiff's rights, regardless of which de-
frndant pays plaintiff. Appellant moved to have the 
titlP insurer joined as a defendant because plaintiff ten-
dered to the Court the issue of which defendant is 
liahle and the resulting declaration would affect tlw 
d<>frndant title insurer. If defendant title insurer were 
not joined, it would not he bound hy the declaratory 
jrnlgrnent, neither for the purpose for determining its 
liability to plaintiff and tlw resulting non-liability of 
appellant, nor for the purpose of determining ultimate 
liability as between the insurers. 'ro avoid piecemeal 
litigation, tlw District Court, by Order of November 29, 
19G5 (R-9) ordt>red First AmNican joined as a party 
ddenclant. For the same reasons, the liability of both 
<lf'f Pndants ought to be decided in this case by construing 
both insnrnnce policies, rather than to dismiss defendant 
First Anwrican for failure to state a claim against it. 
By its pleading, plaintiff stated no claim against 
the title insurPr, so appellant stated it for plaintiff in 
its answer to the complaint for declaratory judgment. 
Contrary to respondent's assertions, plaintiff does in 
fact cbim against tlw title insurer, 'd1ich responded 
to the elaim by paying on the First Federal mortgage. 
'l'hp titlP insurer now seeks to pass its liability to plain-
tif'f' h~· having its counsel appear for plaintiff to claim 
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against appellant. Such should not be permitted hv this 
Court. 
"vVhile a real controversy is a prerequisite 
to a procee-ding for a declaratory judgment, plead-
ings should be interpreted with extreme liberality 
·' and when the pleadings, being so interpreted, re-
veal by implication, dispute, the trial court is em-
powered to render declaratory judgment." 22 Arn 
.Tur 2d p. 951. 
"In view of the purpose of the statute to settle 
controversies before they reach the stage wht>re 
ordinary legal relief is immediately available, it 
is clear that the complaint need not state ·what 
would be a cause of action apart from thL' stat-
ute. " 22 Arn J ur 2d p. 952. 
"Although the Uniform Act and other declar-
atory acts do not provide for counterclaims or 
cross petitions, a defendant may set up his side 
of the controversy as a counterclaim or in a cros~ 
complaint." 22 Am .J nr 2d p. 954. 
See Gray v. De.fa, 103 Vt. 339, 135 P.2d 251, permit-
ting counterclaims in declaratory judgment actions, 
where this Court said: 
"The adjudication of all issues rai8ed by the 
counter claims 'vas necessary to a complete settle-
ment of the rights of the parties arising out of 
said contractual relationships. rrhe judgment rn-
tered did not take into acconnt part of tlw issue~ 
raised by the counte1,elairn and therefore <.lid 11°1 
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completely settle the controversy .... It would be 
<'rror to refuse to take evidence on all issues raised 
hy thPse eounterclaims." 
Hence, appellant urges that the District Court's Or-
der dismissing respondent First American for failure to 
state a claim against it should be reversed and the case 
remanded for determination of respondent First AmPr-
ican 's liability. 
In the alternative, and at the very least, First Ameri-
can should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
against it, but should be dismissed without prejudice. 
If appellant is required to pay plaintiff's claim, 
appellant would assert plaintiff's rights against First 
AmPrican under appellant's right of subrogation, just 
as First Ameriean would against appellant if First 
A1t1Priean werP required to pa~' the claim. 
Huh• -H(b), U.R.C.P., with regard to involuntary 
dismissal, provides: 
"L nless the eourt in its order for dismissal 
othPrwisP specifies, a dismissal under this sub-
division and any dimissal not provided for in 
this ruk•, other than a dismissal for lack of juris-
diction or for improper venue o.r for laek of an 
indespensihle party, operates as an adjudication 
h 't " upon t e men s. 
ln lig·ht of Rul<> 4-1 (b), there is a qrn•stion as to 
whPtlwr or not the dismissal of First American for fail-
lll'P to state a claim against it is a dismissal on the merits. 
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Plaintiff's claim against First American has not been 
decided on the merits and therefore appellant urges that 
this Court, at the very least, reverse the order dismissing 
First American and direct that it be dismissed without 
prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants urge that there are material issues of 
fact remaining, that the pleadings before tht> Court an 
insufficient to resolve the factual issues, that the District 
Court erred as a matter of law in granting summar)' 
judgment in favor of respondents upon grounds that the 
title policy is not "other indemnity" within the meaning 
of appellant's bond, and that the District Court erred 
in dismissing respondent First American for failure to 
state a claim against it, and respectfully submit that the 
summary judgment should be rew•rsed and the case TP· 
mantled to the District Court for determination of tlw 
fa0tual issues, with instruction that respondent First 
American's title policy is "other indemnity" within thP 
meaning of applicant's bond, or at lPast, respondent First 
American should be dismissed without prejudice. 
Respectfull.Y submitted, 
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